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In 1981, sales of American-produced automobiles dropped to their lowest 
level in two decades. As a resuit, auto industry layoffs have reached record 
heights both in the Big Four and in supplier firms. Automakers, moreover, 
increasingly are turning toward international sources of parts and equipment 
for their cars. This worsens the prospects for employment and profits in 
supplier industries. At the same time, imports of automobiles continue to 
capture a large share of the U.S. market. 
Japan, moreover, is reported to have a cost advantage over the United 
States in producing small cars of between $1,000 and $1,500--about half of 
which is attributable to lower labor costs. This has placed U.S. autoworkers 
in a weak bargaining position in negotiating labor contracts. 
In response to these and other conditions, legislation has been introduced 
that would impose domestic (local) content ratios for automotive vehicles. 
These would require that cars and trucks sold in the United States in large 
quantities contain a certain percentage of American parts and labor. 
BACKGROUND AND POLICY ANALYSIS 
In 1981, sales of automobiles by domestic automobile producers fell to 6.2  
million units--the lowest level in 20 years. By March 1982, the number of 
autoworkers on indefinite layoff again reached 250,000 after declining 
steadily from that level in August 1980 to 150,000 in June, 1981. Layoffs in 
auto industry supplier firms also have grown. For each layoff by an 
automaker, an estimated 2 - 2  persons are laid off in the firms supplying the 
auto industry. U.S. automakers, moreover, are turning more toward foreign 
sources of parts and equipment for domestically assembled automobiles. 
Detroit views purchasing from foreign sources not only as a method to acquire 
critically needed parts.quickly but as a way to reduce its costs to compete 
more effectively with Japan. Such foreign purchases also have begun to cut 
into autoworker employment. 
At the same time, imports continue to Capture a high percentage of the 
U.S. auto market. In 1981, despite Japan's voluntary restraints on 
automobiles exported to the United States, imports accounted for 27% of the 
U.S. market--up from 18% in 1978 (a banner year for U.S. auto sales). This 
proportionate increase reflected not so much a rise in absolute numbers of 
Japanese cars sold as the fact that their sales remained constant while sales 
of American cars fell off. 
Bills have been introduced in the 97th Congress, that would establish 
domestic content requirements for automobiles and trucks sold in the United 
States. H.R. 5133 and S. 2300, for example, would require that beginning in 
model year 1983, all automakers selling vehicles in the United States would 
have to meet minimum ratios for American value added according to a scale 
that would depend on the number of vehicles sold. The required U.S. content 
would be phased in as follows: 
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Number of Vehicles Sold: Minimum U.S Content for Model Year: 
1983 1984 1985 
and beyond 
~ o t  over ~ O O , O O O  0% 0% 0% 
Over 100,000 but not over 150,000 8.3 16.7 25.0 
Over 150,000 but not over 200,000 16.7 33.3 50.0 
Over 200,000 but not over 500,000 25.0 50.0 75.0 
Over 500,000 30.0 60.0 90.0 
The penalty for violating these domestic content ratios would be a 25% 
reduction in the the number of motor vehicles or parts that the offending 
automaker could sell in the United States in the model year following the 
violation. (H.R. 2478 would impose a penalty of $2,000 per car.) 
In effect, local content requirements as proposed in H.R. 5133 and S. 2300 
would impose rigid import quotas for both fully assembled vehicles and 
original equipment and would apply to domestic as well as foreign automakers. 
No automaker could sell more than about 150,000 units in the U.S. market 
without local assembly facilities. 
The United Auto Workers (UAW) along with the AFL-CIO have been the most 
vocal supporters of local content legislation. Automotive suppliers also 
tend to favor the legislation. 
According to representatives of the Department of Commerce and the U.S. 
Trade Representative, the Reagan Administration is opposed to local content 
requirements on both trade policy and economic grounds. Imported auto 
dealers vigorously oppose local content legislation, and General Motors and 
American Motors do not support it. 
The debate concerning domestic content requirements centers on their 
probable effects on U.S. employment and the financial recovery of the U.S. 
automotive industry. Considerable difference of opinion also exists on 
several other points, such as whether they would violate U.S. international 
treaty obligations and whether the proposed phase-in timetable and the level 
of the content requirements actually could be attained by foreign automakers. 
EMPLOYMENT EFFECTS 
The UAW has estimated that the local content requirements proposed in H.R. 
5133 and S. 2300 would result in the regeneration of 868,000 jobs in the auto 
and supplier industries--117,000 jobs in the Big Four, 146,000 in U.S. 
subsidiaries of foreign automakers, and 605,000 in supplier industries. 
These estimates are based on the assumption that the market share for 
imports will rise to 35% by 1985 and that the foreign content of domestically 
produced automobiles will increase from 3% in 1981 to 10% in 1985, while the 
U.S. content of imports will remain at zero percent. The UAW projects that 
a domestic content law would keep imports to 25% of the U.S. market and that 
those 25% would have 59% U.S. content. It also would keep the foreign 
content of domestically produced automobiles at only 6% instead of rising to 
10% by 1985. 
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The UAW estimate that 117,000 jobs would be regenerated among the U.S. Big 
Four automakers by holding their foreign content to 6% instead of 10% appears 
to be quite high. The Big Four currently employ about 550,000 persons, 
although they had 760,000 workers in 1978. A reduction of 4 percentage points 
by 1985 in their foreign content (using an employment figure of 700,000), 
therefore, would likely "savew about 28,000 dire'ct jobs (4% of 700,000) and 
about 61,600 jobs (instead of 262,900) in supplier industries. The higher 
UAW figures appear to be based additionally on the assumption that without 
domestic content requirements, the market share for imports will rise from 
25% to 35%. Major economic forecasts, however, foresee the import market 
share falling, not rising, over the long term. 
For employment gains from substituting U.S.-produced vehicles for imports, 
the UAW's estimate of 146,000 direct U.S. jobs generated also appears to be 
quite high. While accurate forecasts of the effect of the local content 
requirements on imports of automobiles and light trucks a r e .  difficult to 
make, under reasonable assumptions such requirements would likely reduce 
imports by about 810rOO0 units by 1985. This assumes that Toyota, Nissan 
(Datsun), Honda, Volkswagen, Subaru, Mazda, and Mitsubishi all would be 
required to reduce their imports by 25% per year beginning in 1984 until they 
reach the 100,000 unit threshold. It also assumes that sales by Isuzu, 
Mercedes Benz, Volvo, BMW, and Peugeot would grow at the same rates over 
1982-85 as they did in 1978-81. It further assumes that British Leyland, 
Saab, Alfa Romeo, and Fiat will regain their 1978 levels of sales, that 
Renault (because of its new retailing arrangements with American Motors) will 
grow 50% faster over 1982-85 than it did in 1978-81, that sales of the Ford 
Fiesta will remain at 35,000 and sales of the DeLorean will increase to 4,000 
units. In this case, passenger car and truck imports would be reduced to 
1,954,000 units instead of the 2,764,000 units actually sold in the United 
States in 1981. 
On average, output of 14 automobiles generates one job (man year), and 
each autoworker job Supports 2.2 jobs in supplier industries. A reduction of 
810,000 imported vehicles, therefore, would generate approximately 59,000 
direct jobs and 127,000 indirect jobs instead of the 146,000 direct and 
335,800 indirect jobs estimated by the UAW. 
A rough estimate of employment effects of the local content requirements 
in H.R. 5133 and S. 2300, therefore, would be a maximum of about 87,000 in 
the automotive industry and 188,600 in supplier industries for a total of 
275,600 jobs. 
Domestic content requirements at the levels required in H.R. 5133 and S. 
2300, therefore, would likely reduce the current autoworker unemployment by 
about one-fourth. These figures seem to be corroborated by recent experience 
in the industry. Since 1978, domestic automaker output has fallen by about 3 
million units, while indefinite layoffs have increased by 250,000 persons. 
Domestic content requirements would reduce imports by a maximum of about a 
fourth the drop in production since 1978. The gain in employment among 
autoworkers and suppliers, therefore, also should be about a fourth of the 
current level of indefinite layoffs. 
Several factors, however, could intervene to cause the gain in U.S. 
employment to be even less than that estimated above. The above calculations 
assume that the 810,000 vehicles purchased instead of the imports are 100% 
American made. If part of those vehicles are supplied by U.S. subsidiaries 
of foreign automakers,.they will still contain a Considerable amount of 
imported original equipment. 





he UAW job estimates, moreover, appear to assume that in the absence of a 
stic content law, foreign automakers will not locate in the United 
es. Actually Volkswagen is .increasing its capacity to assemble 
mobiles and light trucks at its U.S. plant. Honda is scheduled to begin 
production in 1982 of more than 150,000 automobiles per year at its plant in 
Ohio. Nissan (Datsun) is building a plant in Tennessee to produce 156,000 
light pickup trucks per year beginning in late 1983. Toyota and General 
Motors as well as Chrysler and Mitsubishi have been discussing joint 
production of small automobiles. In 1982, Renault, which now owns about half 
of American Motors, intends to begin production of automobiles at an AMC 
plant. 
A reduction in automotive imports, moreover, could strengthen the value of 
the dollar on foreign exchange markets, which would lead to fewer U.S. 
exports and more U.S. imports of other products. Employment for imported 
auto dealers aiso would likely be reduced. The net effect on total U.S. 
employment, therefore, probably would be considerably less than the 
employment effects for the auto industry alone. 
IMPORTS AND RECOVERY 
A second point of disagreement concerning domestic content legislation is 
whether or not the recovery of the U.S. automobile industry depends on 
reducing imports. Proponents argue that increased imports of automobiles are 
a primary cause of the high unemployment and low profitability of U.S. 
automakers. Domestic content requirements would reduce import competition. 
Opponents note, however, that in recent years, the number of imported cars 
sold has been flat. By 1981, the total number of imported cars sold in the 
United States had increased by less than 500 units from 1979 and had risen by 
only 325,000 units from 1978. Total U.S. automobile sales, however, had 
plummeted by 2.8 million units since 1978. Of course, because import sales 
did not decline as the total U.S. market shrunk, the market share for imports 
rose. In a relative sense, import demand rose. 
In September 1980, the U.S. International Trade Commission determined that 
imports were not a substantial cause of injury to the domestic auto industry. 
It viewed the huge drop in total sales, not the small rise in imports, as 
being a more important cause of the industry's problems. The recession, high 
interest rates, declining real discretionary income by households, consumer 
pessimism, high gasoline prices, and other factors have combined to reduce 
total auto sales. 
Imports, however, have placed downward pressure .on prices of U.S. 
automobiles and have set higher standards for fuel economy and certain 
aspects of quality and performance that Detroit is being forced to match. 
Imports also have weakened two underpinnings of Detroit's basic marketing 
strategy, that "bigger is better9' and that obsolescence should be built into 
automobile design. 
For autoworkers, imports have drawn attention to their level of wages and 
benefits which are more than double those in Japan and 50% higher than those 
in all U.S. manufacturing industries. Even with the wage concessions 
negotiated in 1982, autoworker wages (including benefits) are expected to 
rise from $21 per hour in 1981 to $24.50 per hour by 1984. 
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TREATY OBLIGATIONS 
A third point of disagreement is whether or not local content requirements 
would violate U.S. international treaty obligations. Proponents argue that 
over 30 other countries apply such requirements and they have not been the 
source of serious trade friction. The United States would merely be 
providing its industry the protection routinely provided by other countries. 
Opponents point out, however, that the proposed local content legislation 
violates provisions of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 
prohibiting mixing requirements (specifying certain proportions of domestic 
and foreign components in a product) and import quotas. The Canadian 
exemption, by which vehicles imported from Canada would be counted as -being 
domestically produced, also could violate the provision for 
Most-Favored-Nation treatment. 
Nations with local Content provisions tend to be developing countries that 
either are attempting to curb the outflow of foreign exchange or are 
nurturing their own automobile industries. No industrialized countries 
except Greece, Spain, and Australia maintain local content requirements for 
automobiles. Auto exporting countries, such as Germany, Japan, France, the 
United Kingdom, Sweden, and Italy have no such laws. No auto industry that 
is protected by domestic content requirements is competitive in world 
markets. 
Because the U.S. auto market is the world's largest, a U.S. domestic 
Content law would likely be challenged before GATT or invite retaliation by 
auto exporting countries. Retalitory measures would not have to be limited 
to U.S. exports of automobiles or trucks, but could be applied to products 
such as airplanes, heavy equipment, or computers. Such challenges, however, 
usually take considerable time and can provide some breathing room for the 
U.S. industry. 
PHASE-IN TIMETABLE 
A fourth point of disagreement centers on the proposed phase-in timetable 
for the content requirements. Proponents believe that the adverse economic 
conditions in the U.S. auto and supplier industries have continued so long 
that firms cannot wait another three or four years for relief. The proposed 
domestic content legislation, therefore, calls for a partial phase-in of the 
Content requirements beginning in model year 1983 and reaching the ultimate 
levels by model year 1985. 
Opponents argue, however, that no foreign automaker should be expected to 
plan, COnstrUct, and bring production facilities for most of its U.S. sales 
on line in two or three years. Even Volkswagen and Honda who have U.S. 
plants in operation or under construction would have to double or triple 
their U.S. capacity to maintain current sales. 
THE REQUIRED CONTENT LEVELS 
CRS- 6 IB82056 UPDATE-07/23/82 
A fifth point of disagreement is whether or not the required levels are 
actually attainable. Proponents point to the Volkswagen Rabbits assembled in 
the United States, which are approaching 75% U.S. content, as evidence that 
the requirements are reasonable. 
Opponents point out, however, that the proposed content requirements are 
corporate, not model, averages. Foreign car makers sell many different 
models in the United States. A U.S. assembly plant, however, must produce at 
least 150 to 200 thousand units to be of sufficient scale to operate 
efficiently. At best, therefore, foreign producers could efficiently 
assemble only a few models here. The remainder still .would have to be 
produced abroad. When these imported models are averaged into U.S. 
production, the corporate average for U.S. content falls dramatically. 
In 1981, for example, Volkswagen assembled 162,445 Rabbits in the United 
States and imported 135,175 Volkswagens, Audis, and Porsches from Germany, 
the U.S.-produced share being 54%. Assuming that the U.S. produced Rabbits 
had 70% U.S. content and that the imported vehicles cost the same as the 
Rabbits, Volkswagen's corporate average U.S. content would have been 38%. 
Local content ratios of 75 or 90%, therefore, are virtually unattainable 
without nearly eliminating imports. 
Ironically, according to the proposed legislation, a 75% local content 
requirement for Volkswagen would penalize it relative to a company like 
Volvo. Volvo could continue to export up to 100,000 units to the United 
States without any U.S. content. (It sold 65,000 units in 1981. See Table 
1.) Volkswagen, by contrast, would be allowed no imports at all, since its 
U.S.-produced Rabbits would be approaching 75% American content. As long as 
Volkswagen is not able to exceed 75% U.S. Content, it would not be permitted 
any imports on any sales above 200,000 units no matter how many cars it 
produced in the United States. Since at that level, 75% .S. content would be 
required. 
Even if Volkswagen pushed its U.S. Content to 90%, at an output level of 
200,000 units, it still would be allowed to import Only 40,000 vehicles of 
comparable value. It would have to produce 500,000 vehicles in the United 
States with 90% domestic content before it would be allowed to import 100,000 
similarly priced vehicles from Germany. . Before Volkswagen reached U.S. 
production of 500,000 units, however, its total sales would exceed 500,000 
units, and its required domestic content ratio would jump to 90%. As a 
result its allowable imports would again drop to zero. A foreign automaker 
with no U.S. manufacturing presence, therefore, appears to enjoy the greatest 
advantage under the proposed content ratios since it can export 100,000 units 
with no U.S. content required. Starting production in the United States 
actually penalizes foreign automakers in terms of their allowable imports 
into the United States. 
The effect of the propsed content legislation, therefore, would probably 
be to limit imports from any automaker to fewer than 100,000 units. The high 
levels of U.S. content required in the proposed legislation also could 
provide an incentive for foreign automakers to locate in Canada and export to 
the United States under the provisions of the Automotive Products Trade Act 
of 1965, which allows for duty free entry into the United States of Canadian 
automotive products (at least 50% Canadian content). 
PRICE EFFECTS 
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Local content requirements, because they are enforced by import 
restraints, would likely raise prices of both domestic and imported 
automobiles. Proponents argue that such higher prices are necessary to 
restore profits and provide,the capital necessary for investments by U.S. 
automakers. 
Opponents point out that higher prices hurt consumers and transfer income 
from buyers to sellers. Such prices also reduce U.S. export competitiveness 
not only in automobiles, but in industries using automobiles. 
LIGHT TRUCKS 
Under H.R. 5133 and S. 2300, local content requirements would include 
pickup trucks as well as automobiles. Proponents argue that imports of 
pickup trucks from Japan have risen as rapidly as cars. (See TABLE 1.) 
Opponents note, however, that the U.S. light-truck industry is already 
protected by a 25% tariff. (The tariff on passenger cars is only 2.8%.) 
Many of the light trucks from Japan, moreover, have been sold under U.S. 
nameplates (Chevy Luv, Ford Courier, Plymouth Arrow, etc.). Not until 1981, 
did a U.S. automaker begin production of light pickup trucks. 
BARGAINING LEVERAGE 
Proponents argue that a U.S. domestic content requirement is necessary to 
give U.S. trade negotiators leverage in bargaining to reduce barriers to U.S. 
exports in other coun'tries, in particular those with their own domestic 
Content laws. A U.S. content law also could be used to induce Japan to 
increase its defense spending. 
Opponents point out, however, that a'U.S. domestic content law would be 
aimed primarily at Japan. For automobiles, Japan has no local content 
requirements and has reduced its import tariff to zero. Since the mid-1970s 
it has been eliminating other barriers to imports of foreign cars, although 
problems with standards and inspections remain. 
JAPAN'S CONTENT REQUIREMENTS ON. AIRCRAFT 
The UAW argues that domestic content requirements on automobiles are 
justified in view of Japanese domestic content requirements placed on sales 
of airplanes from the United States, in particular warplanes and Boeing 767s. 
The Japanese government insists, however, that it requires local Content 
only in the purchase of military aircraft for national defense purposes. 
Japan feels that in case of war, it should have local manufacturers for spare 
parts. 
According to a Boeing spokesman, Japan did not require local content for 
the Boeing 767 but entered into a risk-sharing agreement. The Japanese 
companies had to invest in the design and engineering of the parts they make. 
If the plane sells well, they stand to make profits, but if it does not, they 
could incur losses. 
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OTHER ARGUMENTS 
Other arguments in favor of local content legislation are that the 
automobile industry is facing such difficult conditions that any help, no 
matter what, is necessary. Domestic content requirements also would not cost 
the Federal Treasury much to implement (compared to various proposals for tax 
credits or buyer subsidies), and the United States now has opportunity to 
influence where international automakers locate new plants that if missed 
might not appear again for a long time. 
Other arguments against local content requirements are that they are the 
type of nontariff barrier to trade that the United States is attempting to 
reduce in other countries, that they reduce competitive pressures on U.S. 
companies to cut costs and improve their products, that they would be costly 
in terms of the efficiency and export competitiveness of the U.S. economy and 
would require extensive records to be kept on the source of each part 
entering into the manufacture of a motor vehicle. 
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TABLE 1. U.S. Passenger Car and Truck Sales by 
Auto Manufacturer, 1981 
(in units) 
Manufacturer cars Trucks 
General Motors (Excluding imports) 
Ford (Excluding imports) 




Volkswagen of America 
(VW, Porsche, and Audi imports) 
American Motors-Renault 
(Renault imports) 
Toyo Kogyo/Mazda (Incl. Ford 
courier trucks) 
Subaru 





Fiat (Includes Lancia) 
Fiesta (Ford-Germany) 
Jaguar-Rover-Triumph 









a/ Mitsubshi cars were sold under Chrysler -
nameplates. The total for Chrysler excludes Mitsibishi imports. 
Source: Automotive News, Jan. 11, 1982, p. 45 and Jan. 18, 
1982, p. 48. 
LEGISLATION 
H.R. 2478 (Traxler, et.al.) 
Establishes quantitative limitations on imports of autos and imposes local 
content requirements of 25 percent beginning in 1983 and rising to 75 percent 
in 1985. Introduced Mar. 11, 1981; referred to the Committees on Ways and 
Means and Energy and Commerce. 
H.R. 5133 (Ottinger, et.al.) 
Establishes domestic content requirements for motor vehicles sold in the 
United States. Introduced Dec. 8, 1981; referred to the Committee on Energy 
and Commerce. 
H.R. 5597 (Gaydos) 
Establishes minimum domestic content ratios for all motor vehicle 
manufacturers which produce over 100,000 vehicles for ultimate retail sale in 
the U.S. Introduced Feb. 4, 1982; referred to the Committee on Energy and 
Commerce. 
S. 2300 (Ford, et.al.) 
Establishes domestic content requirements for motor vehicles sold in the 
United States. Introduced Mar. 30, 1982; referred to the Committee on 
Commerce, Science, and Transportation. 
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CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS 
06/10/81 -- House Subcommittee on commerce, Transportation and 
Tourism held markup of H.R. 5133 and forworded it 
to full committee (Energy and Commerce). 
06/02/82 -- House Committee on Foreign Affairs held hearing on 
U.S.-Japanese Economic Relations including testimony 
on local content. 
04/14/82 -- 179 cosponsors reported for H.R. 5133, 10 for S. 2300: 
03/02/82 -- House Committee on Energy and Commerce held hearing 
on H.R. 5133. 
